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1. Overview
 In this paper, I will discuss the current debates on emergency powers 
in Japan. Emergency powers deal with natural disasters, terrorist attacks, 
and foreign invasions, among other emergencies.
 In Japan, there exist several legislative statutes to deal with natural 
disasters; for example, the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act, which 
stipulates that in emergency situations the government may provide 
various necessities to citizens, cap prices of day-to-day commodities, set 
grace periods for paying debts, et cetera. Because Japan is affected by 
many natural disasters, such as typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis, we 
need such statutes.
 In my view, the existence of so many nuclear power stations in Japan is 
one of the most serious risks the country faces. The stations are 
vulnerable to natural disasters, as well as terrorist attacks. I think that the 
Japanese government should seriously consider whether it is worth 
maintaining these establishments.
 I would like to make an observation about the background of the 
present-day proliferation of terrorism. Terrorist organisations typically 
germinate in failed or weak states. Before the Second World War, failed or 
weak states were often conquered and pacified by stronger ones. 
1 Professor of Constitutional Law, Waseda Law School. This is an expanded 
version of the paper read at the Second Plenary Session of the 10th world 
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, held in Seoul in 
June 2018. I am grateful for various comments received at the occasion. The 
author received financial support from the Nomura Foundation in conducting 
research regarding this paper.
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Nowadays, because wars have, in principle, been outlawed, the 
sovereignty of even a failed state is respected. If we want to respect the 
sovereignty of every state, we have to endure the risk of international 
terrorism. If we want to eliminate all the terrorists, then we have to endure 
the risk of invasion and conquest. As Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro 
point out2, we cannot have it both ways.
 Some politicians in Japan, including Prime Minister Shinzô Abe, claim 
that we should amend the existing Constitution of Japan and accord the 
government emergency powers to deal with natural disasters, terror 
attacks, or foreign invasions. The draft constitution made public by the 
Liberal Democratic Party ?LDP? in 2012 includes a clause that allows the 
prime minister to propose ? if he deems it necessary ? to the cabinet to 
declare an ‘emergency situation’; if the proposal is approved and an 
emergency is declared, the cabinet can change parliamentary statutes by 
issuing orders3.
 If we take seriously Carl Schmitt’s statement that ‘Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception’4, this proposal makes the prime minister the 
sovereign. The proposal, reminding people of the Weimar Republic 
experiences, has been strongly criticised for being too sloppy and 
dangerous. Constitutional scholars are generally sceptical about the courts 
having the will to effectively review the legality of government actions 
during emergency situations.
 Generally speaking, the Constitution of Japan provides only standards 
or principles restricting government actions; as a result, a broad range of 
discretionary powers for the government, as well as for the Diet, can be 
deduced from the Constitution. Therefore, there seems to be little need to 
amend the Constitution to improve the government’s response to 
emergency situations.
2 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: And Their Plan to 
Outlaw War ?Allen Lane, 2017?, p. 369.
3 See https://jimin.jp-east-2.os.cloud.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/130250_1.pdf
4 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab ?University of Chicago 
Press, 2005?, p. 5.
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2.  Why the Constitution of Japan Does not Provide 
for Emergency Powers
 Article 73, Clause 6 of the Constitution provides that: the cabinet may 
enact ‘cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this Constitution 
and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet 
orders unless authorized by such law’. The latter half of this clause was 
not included in the original draft proposed by the GHQ.
 After receiving the GHQ draft in February 1946, the government of 
Japan told the GHQ that it wanted to insert an article which would permit 
the cabinet to issue orders dealing with emergency situations while the 
Diet is not in session5. The GHQ responded that such an article was not 
necessary because parliamentary statutes could grant the government 
broad powers to deal with such situations, including issuing cabinet 
orders. Against this, the Japanese government pointed out that if so, it 
might become necessary for such cabinet orders to include penal 
provisions, which the GHQ accepted6.
 In the deliberation of the draft constitution at the Diet, Mr Tokujirô 
Kanamori, the minister in charge of constitutional affairs, explained why 
constitutional emergency powers were neither desirable nor necessary. 
According to him, under the new constitution, the cabinet can at any time 
convene the Diet ?Article 53?; when the Lower House is dissolved, the 
cabinet can ask the Upper House to take emergency measures ?Article 54, 
Clauses 2 and 3?. And if necessary, the Diet may enact statutes granting 
the government broad powers to deal with emergency situations ?Article 
73, Clause 6?7. Mr Kanamori’s view seems still valid and sound today.
5 Article 8, Clause 1 of the Meiji Constitution stipulated that: ‘The Emperor, in 
consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public 
calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in 
the place of law’.
6 Kenzô Takayanagi, Ichirô Ôtomo, and Hideo Tanaka eds., Nihonkoku Kenpô 
Seitei no Katei ?The Making of the Constitution of Japan?, Vol. II ?Yûhikaku, 
1972?, p. 28.
7 Shin Shimizu ed., Nihonkoku Kenpô Shingiroku ?The Minutes of the Deliberations 
of the Draft Constitution of Japan?, expanded edition, Vol. 3 ?Hara Shobô, 1976?, 
pp. 411-12.
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3. Should We Amend Article 9?
 Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan states that the government is 
prohibited from exercising threats or use of armed power ‘as means of 
settling international disputes’. The government is also prohibited from 
maintaining ‘war potential’. Successive administrations have claimed that 
the government may exercise the right of individual self-defence to repel 
illegal attacks from abroad and, therefore, may maintain a military force 
that is adequate to perform this task. I think that Article 9 has worked as a 
rational pre-commitment to lower the risk of military conflicts in East Asia.
 The Supreme Court, which is the highest authoritative interpreter of 
the constitutionality of any state action ?Article 81 of the Constitution?, has 
been quite reticent to express its views on Article 9. In contrast, the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which is, strictly speaking, just a bureau under 
the Cabinet, has worked as the de facto authoritative interpreter. The risk 
of according such a significant task to a cabinet bureau became apparent 
when, in July 2014, the Abe administration overturned ? without sufficient 
justification ? the long-held view of the government that only the 
individual right of self-defence is permitted under Article 98.
 Further, in May 2017, Mr. Abe proposed an amendment to Article 9 to 
confirm the status quo of the self-defence forces. Although he has never 
disclosed the real motive driving this apparently unnecessary proposal, 
many people suspect that he intends to consolidate the government’s new 
interpretation of Article 9. These moves have been strongly criticised by 
not only the opposition parties, but also an overwhelming majority of 
constitutional scholars, as an attempt to incrementally undermine 
constitutionalism in Japan.
 If Mr Abe’s proposal to amend the Constitution were solidly supported 
by persuasive reasons, it would not be difficult for him to acquire 
necessary majorities in both houses. In fact, at the time of writing 
?September 2019?, the current government coalition secures necessary 
two thirds seats in the Lower House and more than 60% seats in the Upper 
House. The reality is that even MPs of the government coalition are not 
8 See Yasuo Hasebe, ‘The End of Constitutional Pacifism?’, Washington International 
Law Journal, Volume 26, Number 1 ?2017?.
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sure whether it is necessary to change the Constitution in accordance to 
Mr Abe’s proposal. According to the opinion poll conducted by NHK 
?Japan Broadcasting Corporation? in May 2018, only 19% of those polled 
answered that amending the Constitution was the political issue to be 
prioritised over other issues.
4. The North Korea Crisis
 The recent incidents surrounding the Korean peninsula can be 
described as a roller-coaster ride. By describing it as a ‘deteriorating 
security situation’, Mr. Abe seems to think that he can convince others 
that the environment is favourable for the revision of Article 9. 
 What I can say on this is quite limited. First, it is unlikely that enlarging 
the roles and missions of the self-defence forces will persuade the North to 
abandon its military projects. North Korea’s foremost objective is ensuring 
regime survival. The security is the pre-eminent factor guiding their 
actions. Further, it assumes that holding the capability to attack the United 
States with nuclear bombs is the only effective way to achieve that. 
 Second, amending the Constitution of Japan cannot be a means to 
solve the North Korea crisis. We should distinguish between situations to 
which constitutional law can respond and those to which it cannot. Of 
course, in a game of chicken, the best strategy is to feign to be irrational. 
However, changing the Constitution in the face of a nuclear threat is 
ridiculously irrelevant, rather than feigning to be irrational.
 Third, after the standoff and the escalation of tension, North Korea 
appears to be ready to begin serious negotiations. Perhaps, we should not 
be too optimistic; this is because North Korea has made similar pledges on 
numerous occasions in the past, with little or no intention of honouring 
them. Further, l ike so much we have witnessed during Trump’s 
presidency, this may be just for show. Even after the US-North Korea 
summits of 12 June 2018 and 27-28 February 2019, we are as yet no closer 
to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The first summit 
produced only a vague communiqué, and the second summit ended 
abruptly with no agreement. We may not be able to achieve the goal of 
‘complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation’ in the near future. 
 However, I think that negotiation is unavoidable because there is no 
feasible military option available to either side9. To resort to military 
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options is disastrous not only for the two countries, but also the whole of 
East Asia. We should expect a long and winding negotiation process of the 
denuclearization.
5. The ‘Uniquely Japanese Values’
 Sometimes, I feel that those advocating the amendment of the 
Constitution of Japan are suffering from excessive anxiety. They say that 
the Constitution has many defects. However, as explained in section 1 
above, the so-called ‘defects’ do not seem serious enough to warrant 
worrying about them. And it is not essential to amend Article 9, if its 
purpose is just to confirm the status quo of the self-defence forces
 However, the latent objective of the LDP politicians, clamouring for an 
amendment of the Constitution, may be to convert Japan into a more 
authoritarian regime. Right-wing politicians, including Mr. Abe, often 
claim that liberal constitutionalism is an idea foreign to Japan, and that it 
can become a much better country if this foreign idea is excluded and the 
Japanese spirit is purified10. 
 The peculiar idea that there are values unique to Japanese culture, and 
which all Japanese people should embrace, sustained the national 
seclusion policy during the Edo era, as well as the expansionism through 
9 It should be noted that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are relatively weak 
and inaccurate. They cannot annihilate its opponents’ retaliating power at a first 
strike. Thomas Schelling explains that: ‘A weapon that can hurt only people, and 
cannot possibly damage the other side’s striking force, is profoundly defensive; 
it provides its possessor no incentive to strike first’ ?Thomas Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict ?Harvard University Press, 1960?, p. 233?.
10 If we may use the distinction between societas and universitas made by Michael 
Oakeshott, these politicians intend to turn Japan under the current constitution 
into a very different association, that is, universitas. In a societas, the state only 
establishes a space of social life and rules to be observed in acting by its members, 
and each member decides how to live by herself and pursues her own purposes. 
The current constitution of Japan says that Japan is a societas in this meaning. In 
contrast, in a universitas, the state sets common substantive purposes every 
member should collaborate to realise; the state manages and controls material 
and human resources in the society to promote the purposes. Japan before and 
during the second world war was a universitas. See Michael Oakeshott, ‘On the 
Character of a Modern European State’, in his On Human Conduct ?Clarendon 
Press, 1975?.
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military means before the Second World War. It was argued that because 
the emperor is a benevolent monarch who rules his subjects without 
considering his private interests, all people ? not just the Japanese ? should 
obey him as if they were his children. Under this ideology, foreigners who 
did not obey the emperor were seen to be insufficiently compliant and, 
therefore, deserving of punishment; such an ideology was loathsome to 
neighbouring nations.
 If Japan discards liberal constitutionalism and embraces the so-called 
‘uniquely Japanese values’11, its relations with surrounding countries will 
deteriorate spectacularly. In other words, right-wing politicians’ attempt to 
amend the Constitution is one of the most serious emergency risks that 
Japan currently faces.
6.  Dicey’s Suggestion: How to Respond to Unforeseeable 
Situations
 Last, I would like to make an observation on emergency powers. Those 
who advocate the inclusion of clauses on emergency powers in the 
Constitution often point out that we cannot foresee the extreme disasters 
that may occur. Because we are not prophets, their observation is certainly 
true. However, these people use this reasoning to assert that we should, 
therefore, accord the government sweeping powers to deal with any 
emergency that may occur. Their recommendation is disproportionate to 
the problem they intend to solve, and quite dangerous.
 Albert Venn Dicey, the eminent English constitutional scholar, has 
stressed in his An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
that in England the government has been as much subject to the rule of 
regular laws as ordinary citizens. However, at the end of his analysis of the 
rule of law, he says that there are ‘times of tumult or invasion when for the 
sake of legality itself the rules of law must be broken’12. He added that 
11 As to the ‘uniquely Japanese values’, see, for example, Section IV of Yasuo 
Hasebe, ‘Constitutional Change in Japan’, in Routledge Handbook of Constitutional 
Change, eds. Alkmene Fortiadou and Xenophon Contiades ?Routledge, 2019?.
12 Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 
10th ed. ?Macmillan, 1959?, p. 412; cf. Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: 
Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies ?Transaction Publishers, 2002 
?originally published in 1949??, pp. 138-39.
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such executive actions were always undertaken with the understanding 
that a parliamentary indemnity act would have to retrospectively legalise 
the actions that are found to be illegal. I should add that such a treatment 
would presuppose that members of the executive are individually 
responsible for the illegal acts that may be committed. For example, they 
may be individually impeached, or suffer a monetary penalty.
 We can detect similar precedents in other countries. In the United 
States, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus 
during the Civil War13; however, he had the Congress retroactively 
constitutionalise his actions. In the 1860s, when the Prussian Diet refused 
to approve the state budget for several years, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
unilaterally made disbursement to prepare for the wars against Denmark 
and Austria; after the victories, he asked the Diet to indemnify the ministers.
 In Japan too, when the Japan Red Army highjacked a JAL airplane in 
Bangladesh in September 1977, the prime minister Takeo Fukuda, without 
any legal basis, decided to release 9 Red Army members who had been 
imprisoned in order to save passengers held hostages. The justice minister 
resigned, afterwards. Mr Fukuda’s action has been called the ‘extra-legal 
measure’.
 To let the government act contra legem when dealing with an emergency 
situation and give parliamentary indemnity afterwards is preferable to 
according the government dangerously broad-ranging powers beforehand. 
Thus, the government will take only those actions during emergencies 
that are absolutely necessary; if it behaves disproportionately, it cannot 
expect the parliament to indemnify it. Further, we cannot trust politicians 
who complain that they cannot cope with emergencies without first being 
granted untrammelled authority. We should not grant any such authority 
to these cowardly politicians. It should be noted that a delegated 
dictatorship may easily transform itself into a sovereign dictatorship, as the 
Weimar precedent shows. 
13 In his letter to Albert G. Hodges, April 4, 1864, Lincoln wrote that: ‘I felt that 
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming 
indispensable to the preservation of the nation’. It should be noted that Lincoln’s 
ultimate purpose was to save the union; abolishing slavery was its means. See, 
on this point, John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy ?Penguin, 2018?, pp. 240-
45.
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7. Conclusion
 Although the present situation is very different from that in the 1930s 
? the mass mobilisation and militarisation of entire societies is not 
occurring ? we should not remain complacent. Even if we do not encounter 
an outright violent coup d’état, we may witness the undermining of 
democracy from within through the mechanism of executive aggrandisement. 
As David Runciman suspects, this may lead to the end of democracy14.
 As Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde points out15, emergency laws as 
normal legislation bear the risk of eroding the rule of law. However, to 
insert in the constitutional code sloppy clauses according the government 
emergency powers would entail more dangerous risks as the experience 
under the Weimar constitution shows. The government may constantly 
have recourse to the convenient measures, and political parties in the 
parliament may evade the responsibility to form a stable majority 
sustaining the administration on the pretext that the government can 
always use these measures.
 So, my conclusion is that we should think twice before introducing 
emergency clauses into our Consti tut ion. Before amending the 
Constitution or legislating special laws, we should make the best use of 
what we have.
14 David Runciman, How Democracy Ends ?Profile Books, 2018?.
15 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘The Repressed State of Emergency’, in his 
Constitutional and Political Theory, eds. Mirjam Künkler and Tine Stein ?Oxford 
University Press, 2017?.
